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Critical II/literacy:
Humanism, Heidegger,
Anti-Humanism
Renate Holub

1. AGAINST HUMANISM

Rumor has it that humanism is out and anti-humanism is in. 1
This, at least, is the feeling one gets while watching the late-twentieth-century contest-of-the-faculties show in the academy. Those
intellectuals in the humanities who think of themselves as avantguarding something of a political consciousness neatly register
the world of texts under two distinct headings: that which one
fancies apposite to humanism (traditional humanism, marxist
humanism, etc.), and that which one fancies affixed, suffixed, or
prefixed to humanism (pre-humanism, post-humanism, etc.). The
complexity of difference in discursive formations is conveniently
reduced to a simple equation: humanism to any power equals
conservativism squared, whereas the square-root of anti-humanism
squarely roots infinitesimal liberational power.
Let me refer you, to get to the point, to a critical discourse
from the eighties on cultural literacy as it appeared in the 1984/85
issue of Boundary 2 entitled "Humanism and the University."2 Contrary to the topic announced in its title, the issue deals
with neither humanism nor the university. And it does not deal
with the relation of the university to humanism either. Though
the two volumes, subdivided into "The Discourse of Humanism"
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and "The Institutions of Humanism," comprise something of a
thousand pages and almost fifty contributors, humanism is not
even in one of these contributions cross-culturally or genealogically considered. Nor is the university considered in terms of its
complex field of operations in a society dynamically moving towards informatization. The complexity of the "university," with
its relation of knowledge-production
processes to interested
stratas within the industrial-military-administrative
complex, becomes reduced in Boundary 2 to the "English Department," and
"humanism" is ritually reduced to an empty noun which those
initiated to anti-humanism will fill with a sufficiently amorphous
conservative content. 3 The noun "humanism" is put from the start
under such an inexorable anti-humanist siege that its final terminal
bombing perforates nothing but a wasteland. Resistance to such
systematic destruction, in the form of counter-argument or
counter-memory to anti-humanism, is, with the exception of
Gerald Graff, thoroughly rooted out from the beginning in a peculiar spirit of orthodoxy. A sad ending, if one considers that the
editor had his heart in the right place when he reacted to the
report on the humanities by William J. Bennett, who had called
upon educators to restore to the core curriculum the great canons
of Western civilization, thereby ignoring the cultural needs of a
multi-ethnic and multi-class society . That Boundary 2 intervened
in that unsettling issue of cultural literacy and illiteracy needs to
go on record . Yet what also needs to go on record are the rhetorics
of that discourse as presented in Boundary 2. What I would like
to say is this : the metaphorics emanating from these texts are
grounded in a formidable workout in phenomenological reductionism without sufficient reflection on its own life-enhancing
principle of the negative, and without sufficient reflection on its
own possible systemic institutional complicity in the preservation
of a conservative and dangerous status quo . Following relentless
logics of reductionism, many of the contributors to that issue on
the discourse on humanism and the university intransigently close
the door on cross-cultural and political issues before the issue of
humanism and the university has been examined .
I will in the following 1) briefly comment on some of the
reductionist principles that dominate the rhetoric of antihumanism, 2) evoke the imagery of desires operating in the subtextuality of that gesture (geometry over history), and 3) propose
the minimal contours of a possible alternative to reductionism,
the contours of a literacy of differentiation, which those in the
business of critical literacy might want to take into consideration.
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2. LOGICS OF ANTI-HUMANISM

Many of the stories in this anthology on humanism are told
by members of the "English Institute." A stray philosopher, a
political scientist, a sociologist, or a theologian was allowed to
join the ranks here and there, yet only if that voice melodiously
carried the anti-humanism tune. Transmitters of knowledge from
other fields-from physics or biology, or perhaps from economy
or ecology-were denied, so it appears, any possibility of transgression. At first sight, when comparing the historical trajectories
of educational policy structures of a variety of nations, this bias
makes sense. Problems of cultural literacy naturally tend to receive
more attention from that intellectual community which works in
the context of the national language and literature in question.
So that the "English Institute" should enlist itself in that march
against Bennett is not without precedent. Indeed, it keeps with
a tradition. After all, supporters of Bennett originate in that community as well-Allan Bloom with his The Closing of the American
Mind, for instance. But who or what compels the "English Institute" to fetishize that tradition, to exclude members from "foreign"
fields of knowledge in an era (let us call it postmodern for lack
of a more convenient term) in which the formation and control
of cultural literacy, as well as illiteracy, is related to interstructural
decentralizations that lie far beyond the domain and reach of the
"English Institute," while simultaneously exerting systemic pressures (significant curtailment of funding, etc.) on the formation
of that institute? So why does the "English Institute" cultivatewithout much self-reflection on the marginal space it inhabits next
to the social sciences and the hard sciences in the context of the
university-the
image of self-appointed leadership on issues
which concern the intellectual and social community at large?
Why does it display recurrent bouts of xenophobia when it comes
to hard scientists, to economists, to computer scientists, to
ecologists, or to information technologists? And yet, these rather
alarming symptoms of xenophobia mysteriously disappear when
intransigent opponents to "humanism" are concerned, such as
Heidegger .
The "anti-humanist" discourse on humanism and the university, as response to Bennett's response to the literacy crisis, takes
place in the "English Institute" and Heidegger's letter "Brief iiber
den Humanismus," written in 1947 to his French friend Jean Beaufrais who would, a few decades later, cause headlines with his
declaration that "there was no holocaust." So this letter on
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humanism becomes the authoritative reference, both in terms of
its reductionist methodology and its logic of desire, of this rhetoric
against humanism .4 A discourse which desires to be a political
discourse against authority, control, and power, against ethnic
and cultural underrepresentation in curricula development, that
discourse chooses the authority of Heidegger's text. This is one
of the foremost principles of the anti-humanists. I am not interested here in a lengthy rehashing of Heidegger's past, nor in
the relationship between his past and his philosophy, nor in the
question of whether his can be a great philosophy when his ethics
were so despicable. 5 These are questions one has to answer to
and for oneself. It is in any event easy to find out that Heidegger
became a Nazi when the power of Nazism enhanced his power
structure as a university administrator and philosopher (as many
petit bourgeois tend[ed] to opportunistically adjust to and accommodate the wind that blows) and that, when morally and financially implicated after the war, he skillfully tried to cover up the
sacrifices he had offered to that regime, mostly in the currency
of terminating careers of the less fit-in Nazi terms . It is also easy
to find out that he is a perhaps unsurpassed master in handling
the German language, and that he has fascinated many a mind
with his teachings on the possibilities and powers, the impossibilities and powerlessness, residing in language. What seems
somewhat more problematic is whether Heidegger's metaphysical
and theological program is by necessity the theoretical authority
on the basis of which to interrogate the American university and
its vast and complex operative itinerary at the turn of the twentieth
to the twenty-first century. Simply because Allan Bloom spouts
his conservative jeremiads against "the German connection" 6against Nietzsche and Heidegger as dangerous extremists who
relativize the realm of ethical values, who preach elitism and inequality over democracy and equality, who embrace creativity
over rationality, rootedness and provinciality over cosmopolitanism-simply because Bloom polemicizes against Heidegger is
very little reason indeed to polemicize with Heidegger against
Bloom. Why wage the struggle on oedipal grounds?
Heidegger's metaphysical authority, when it comes to the
question of humanism and the university, is a theoretical choice
that apparently has its advantages. It legitimizes a quite restrictive
view as to what humanism and anti-humanism are. This helps to
eliminate the experiences of different forms of humanism from
the pages of history, such as the complex period of Italian
humanism, for instance. So in the very act of arguing for a more
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democratic, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic representation of
voices which have hitherto been silenced within the discourse on
humanism and the university, one of the disciplines which has
traditionally played a rather marginal role in the academy, Italian
studies, is again, this time thanks to Heidegger's thanking thinking, without a voice. 7 In the above mentioned letter, "Brief iiber
den Humanism us," Heidegger distinguishes, among other things,
between three terms: homo humanus,
humanitas,
and
humanism. 8 The positive terms are the first two, whereas the
latter, whether in a singular or plural constellation, is a negative
term. "Gegen den Humanismus wird gedacht, weil er die
Humanitas des Menschen nicht hoch genug ansetzt" (321). So in
a typical Heideggerian rhetorical move, a double operation takes
place in such a statement. By using the passive voice of the German
language, "wird gedacht," which grammatologically does not require the agent who or by whom "gedacht wird," which does not
require, that is, by whom something is being thought or reflected
upon, agency or a subject or responsibility is being ousted from
the statement which takes place in history. Simultaneously, in
the second part of the sentence, which is connected to the first
part by a good old traditional household principle of causality,
agency or a subject of responsibility is re-established: "weil er die
Humanitas des Menschen nicht hoch genug ansetzt," because
humanism, now an anthropomorphized entity consisting of a will
and a mind, did not validate highly enough the humanity or the
"humanitas" of the human being, the "homo humanus." Yet simply by using the passive voice I am not convinced that it is not
Heidegger, after all, who thinks against the "Humanismus,"
rather than an unknowable and mysterious force. And what
Heidegger proposes is that "humanitas" and the "homo
humanus" are actually constitutive or take part of the same entity,
of the truth of Being (Wahrheitdes Seins). Heidegger believes that
pre-socratic thinking, an originary form of thinking as he sees it
in Parmenides and Heraklitus, where "thinking is in its element,"
as he phrases it, is superior to post-socratic forms of thinking,
Greek classical philosophy that is, particularly as that form of thinking entered the Latin language and world, which Heidegger then
equates with techne or the instrument in education and culture.
Because Italian humanism or the humanism of the fourteenth to
the sixteenth centuries is merely an "ism" that reiterates the power
of that techne, a "renascentia romanitatis" and not a "renascentia
presocratica," it too belongs to the category that opposes the search
for the true Being. As such, it is no good in Heidegger's ethics.
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For in order to "den Menschen wieder in sein Wesen zuruck-zubringen," in order to return the "homo human us" to the true Being,
in order to determine the "Menschlichkeit des Menschen," the
"humanitas" of the "homo humanus," one has to speak highly
of the Being (Sein)and lowly of the beings (Seiende),and interrogate
the structure which imposes the sphere of beings on the Being:
language.
So in Heidegger's rhetoric, humanism, in its being in time,
in its historicity, is reduced to a philosophical and ontological
category. That is to say, that historicity of humanism, which for
Heidegger consists in the "renascentia romanitatis," that historicity is reduced to a philosophical and ontological category.
Humanism becomes introduced to Heidegger's concept of time
while simultaneously being excluded from non-Heideggerian concepts of time. What is eclipsed in this doubly reductionist process
are the differences in the histories of humanisms, the specificity
of different cultures and histories such as Italian humanism, for
instance, and the trajectory of the various reception histories of
the various humanisms, which include the discourses on
humanism during the fascist period in Italy and Germany as well.
The cultural, political, social, and economic world of Italian
humanism, with its many levels of differentiable practices, with
its contradictory tendencies towards cultural and political centralization and fragmentation, with its grounding role, as illustrated
in many of the pages of Gramsci' s Quaderni,in the aborted efforts
in the formation of the modern Italian state, that historical and
social complexity in time is reduced, in the name of "being" and
"time," to a philosophical category. 8 Italian humanism can only
exist, in Heidegger's pages, qua "renascentia romanitatis," or it
has no right to existence at all.
It should be expected that Heidegger's authoritarian removal
of Italian humanism from the historical map would cause some
anxiety among supporters with ineluctable ties to Italy . So it comes
as no surprise that Ernesto Grassi, both an ardent epigone and
distributor of Heideggerian philosophy, as well as an insider to
Italian humanism, would rather ambiguously watch the annihilation of an entire Italian tradition . His solution to the problem is
ingenious . In his Heideggerand the Questionof RenaissanceHumanism
(1983), he argues that a correct understanding of Italian humanism
would have to recognize the philosophical connection between
Italian humanism and Heidegger .10 The philosophical project of
Italian humanism was not, he contends, the neo-platonism of
the Florence Academy, or Ficino and his acolytes, nor was it
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Renaissance Aristoteleanism, since both adhere to a naive anthropomorphism, immanent values, and the rediscovery of the
potentialities of the human being. Rather, the authentic
philosophical project of Italian humanism focuses on the limited
possibilities of existence. That project, which originated in the
non-ficinian humanism of a Dante, a Boccaccio, and a Salutati,
was then continued in the rhetorical treatises of a Tesauro and a
Pellegrini. It culminates in Vico. "One of the central problems of
Humanism," Grassi writes in a Heideggerian pose, "is not man,
but the question of the original context, the horizon or 'openness'
in which man and his world appear" (17). And he claims further :
The amazing thing, usually overlooked,
not dealt with in Humanism by means
frontation with traditional metaphysics,
analysis and interpretation of language,

is that these problems are
of logical speculative conbut rather in terms of the
especially poetic language.

(17).

In order to maintain his position on the selective affinities
between Heidegger and Italian humanism, and above all on the
pre-Heideggerian originality of Italian humanism, Grassi is obliged to make three moves: first, by placing the discourses of
Italian humanism in the order of a negative theology in the tradition of Dionysius the Aeropagite and John of the Cross-that
order which played an eminent role, next to German mysticism,
in the formation of Heidegger's conceptuality-he
silently eliminates from the Italian philosophical map many other theoretical
confrontations, such as the extensive confrontation between the
materialist epigones of the Arab traditions (Averroes) and the
idealist humanists who were foundational in the rhilosophical
formation of Bruno and Galileo, as well as Vico. 1 Second, by
emphasizing a preoccupation with the relation between language
and the thing rather than thought and the thing-by understanding, that is, the relation between res and verba primarily as an
ontological problem and not as a historical or political problem as
to how language functions in a political and historical contextGrassi needs to ascribe to Italian humanism a concern with ontological difference, a concern with the difference between "Sein"
and the "Seiende," while eliminating from Italian humanism its
express discourses on the relation of thought to action. And third,
by ascribing to Italian humanism a Heideggerian understanding
of the primacy of poetic language in the intimate experiences with
original Being, Grassi is required to reduce diverse intellectual
and political activities as expressed in language to poetic activities
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concerned with the original realm of the non-logical. In short, he
gets, perhaps understandably, carried away. While I see that the
question of the limitations of knowledge has been a by-product
of much of philosophy and theology in the Western tradition, and
while I see that this question has found an expression in the
discourses on the possibilities and limitations of language during
Italian humanism, particularly in poetic and aesthetic theories, I
also see that the adherence to a philosophical notion of limited
or !imitable knowledge to which only a few select poets/priests
have access is by far a safer device than a democratic notion of
knowledge and action in societies where the mass of the people
are dominated, controlled, and manipulated by aristocratic hierarchies. Power has, historically, usually needed legitimations, and
Christian dogma, with its emphasis on the limited possibilities of
existence, has played a formidable role in delimiting the realm of
possibility for the many while exponentially expanding that realm
of possibility for a privileged few. I am afraid that Grassi's
Heideggerianized reductive tours de force, as understandable as
they are in his permanent crusade against the non-metaphorical,
non-poetical, and non-rhetorical, would have to be considerably
emended: by Blumenberg's work on myth for one, and by Carin's
and Gramsci' s respective work on intellectual history and the
history of intellectuals for another. 12 It would reveal a quite differently concealed story.
If Heidegger's "Brief iiber den Humanism us" was not particularly convenient for Grassi's sense of history, its absolutist rules
of time and causation were especially convenient for the reductionist practices of the discourse on humanism as it unfolds in
Boundary 2. That discourse is not particularly interested in historical or cultural or conceptual or discursive reconstructions of different forms of humanisms, judging from the absence of even a
minimal narrative on Italian humanism. Though the editor becomes indignant when an inquiry by detractors from antihumanism-to
whom he counts the journals Critical Inquiry and
New Literary History-is "virtually devoid of reference to the historical context out of which the ( ... ) project" emerges, it is very
strange indeed that there is no reference to his own historical
contextuality. 13 So a further guiding principle of the rhetoric of
anti-humanism is its obsession with anti-history. The issue on
"Humanism and the University" includes, as already mentioned,
the subcategories "The Discourse of Humanism" and "The Institutions of Humanism." If a reader had hoped to find a Foucauldiantype analysis of the institutional or discursive formation of
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humanism, that reader is in for some disappointment. Yet a critical
study of the complex formation of the many institutions and discourses on humanism, particularly as these formations relate to
the institutional formations in the sciences and of political
mythologies, would have been more than welcome. Indeed,
Heidegger's interpretation of Italian humanism, for instance, as
a historical epoch, and his concomitant philosophical rejection of
that period, would be seen as a co~1struction based in good part
on both an acceptance of a definition of humanism as developed
by Burckhardt and a rejection of the validation of that definition.
In other words, Heidegger rejects philosophically something that
"is" on the basis of accepting that same "is" in its cultural and
historical dimensions as established by Burckhardt. So an inquiry
into the institutional formation of humanism would have come
across Burckhardt' s eminently influential role in the narrative design of humanism and the Renaissance, and much would have
been unearthed in such an archaeology: how his notion of
humanism, a cultural entity with an emphasis on pagan values,
individualism, affirmation of earthly values and opposition to the
hegemonic church, how that notion posited humanism as the
beginnings of modernity. And how, from a philosophical, universal, and hegemonic perspective, Burckhardt's understanding of
humanism and the Renaissance has its legitimacy. It is the instrumentalist point of view of a cosmopolitan intellectual who
emarginates and delegitimizes the specificity of a different history,
and who reduces the long march towards independence, autonomy, and self-determination of the Italian nation to a
philosophical category. Difference must yield to the orthodox
party line of universal philosophy. Yet Italian intellectuals, De
Sanctis, for instance, and many others before and after him, such
as Gramsci, were unable to disregard the underside of humanism,
the fact that the nascent bourgeoisie in Italy, in spite of its production of forms of knowledge that should provide a basis for
philosophical ~·nd scientific modernity, was unable to enter, as
did Spain, England, and France, a political modernity in the form
of an absolute monarchy. 14 Italy should become a pawn in the
hands of the superpowers of modernity, and Burckhardt's limited
judgment of what humanism was reflects the partiality and
interestedness of those intellectuals who speak in the name of
interested power .
It is perhaps not all that surprising that it should be during
the fascist period, both in Italy and Germany , that humanism
resurfaced next to Burckhardt as a problematical issue. A study
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of the institutional formations of humanism, if Boundary 2 would
have consented to such an inquiry, could hardly have avoided
that episode as well. The German Nazi ideologies, attentive towards constructing a mythology which would establish Germany
as the heir to technological modernity while simultaneously distancing itself from the Latinity of the Romance cultural traditions,
found humanism to be something of a nuisance. Against
humanism (as an epoch) and for the Middle Ages, against classical
humanism with its mythologies and for Germanic traditions with
its thundering gods, against Latinity and for Germanity, and if
for some reason one is indeed unable to resist the attractions of
classical philosophy, then for Nazi's sake the Greeks, pre-socratic
preferably, and not the Latins. The Third Reich traced its political
and cultural roots to the Middle Ages and its spiritual roots beyond
to the deep black forests on German terrain. Humanism was out
of place in that pure Germanic lineage, and against humanism
was therefore the preferred pose. Italian fascists were somewhat
more in a bind, and the debates surrounding humanism in the
early thirties reflect the ambiguities of that binding situation. After
all, if, as Burckhardt had authoritatively proposed it, Italian
humanism is the cradle of modern European civilization, then the
inventors of that humanism, who were Italian, should proudly
be legitimated by modern Italians. Yet concurrently, that historical
epoch, with its economic rootedness in the pragmatic practices of
merchants and bankers of the nascent bourgeoisie, and with its
aspirations for a sovereign nation not above but next and comparable to France, Spain, and England, that cultural reconstruction
produced a vision too small for the grand imperial designs of
Italian fascists. So more and more effective legitimization was
sought in the link with the medieval unity and cosmopolitanism
of the feudal aristocracy of the Holy Roman Empire and, better
still, with the glory that was Rome. Humanism caused some problems in the various attempts to establish continuities beyond
periodizations, since it deviated from an authentic genealogy that
began with the Roman Empire, prospered in the unity of the Holy
Roman Empire, and culminated in Mussolini. Yet humanism had
an eminently complex arsenal of symbolics to feed into the imaginary of subsequent times. There are images of independent and
powerful city-states, of civil rights, of struggles against the feudal
regime in the interest of the political power of the communal
bourgeoisie; of permanent quests for a national language and an
independent culture, for an autonomous ltalianity, all of which
propitiously haunted the fascist imagination as well. It was in the
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multiplicity of the figure of Machiavelli that the Italian discourses,
during the fascist period, on humanism and anti-humanism, with
their antinomies and contradictions, were neutralized and preliminarily laid to rest. For Machiavelli could both afford to stand as the
nietzscheanized strongman of Italy's inevitably destined will towards a reality beyond the ethical constraints of democratic norms,
beyond good and evil, as well as the balanced and rational representation of a mind whose diagnosis of the specificity of the
Italian situation, the imbalance and discrepancy between collective
political needs and elitist cultural production, had indeed signified
the burial of the Italian national dream. The fascist ideologues,
required by trade, as any ideologue, to ideologically neutralize,
appease, and control the diversity of its constituency, had proven
their talents indeed. Machiavelli was a splendid symbolic choice,
controlling the diversity of the cultural unconscious of fascism's
economic power, unifying the imaginary of the petit-bourgeois
shopowner, of the bourgeois landowners, and of the grandbourgeois capitalowner alike. In Machiavelli, humanism and antihumanism opportunity metaphorized into one. 15
That, of course, was the mythological world of the Nazi and
fascist ideologues, and perhaps one should not take the actors of
Boundary 2 to task for not wanting to subject themselves to the
fallout of that unsettling historical catastrophe. Yet their resistance
to history, their unwillingness to place phenomena in a historical,
in a social, in a cultural context, their propensity towards excessive
reductionism is unsettling as well. There is much talk, on these
pages, for instance, of "the dominant discourse" or of the "dominant political structure of power," yet no attempt is made to analyze
or provide a narrative that would explain what this "dominant
discourse" might be. There is much talk of reproduction and legitimation of texts, critics, teachers, and culture, as well as of sociopolitical structures which serve the hegemonic process of the
dominant culture, yet no narrative explains how and where a
hegemonic process might operate. This obsession with excessive
reductionism, this categorical refusal to differentiate and place
events in historical contextualities, signals a psychogram that represses the instabilities, fluctuations, and contingencies that is
history . The anti-humanist struggle against humanism which
tirelessly evokes its conscious motivations for its critical raison
d'etre, its intransigent struggle against the powerful status quo,
simultaneously messages an unconscious desire rhetorically arising from the deep structures of the anti-humanist texts. These
metaphorics are marked by the clarity, simplicity, and staticity of
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spatial geometry over and above the contingent temporalities of
history.
3. GEOMETRY OVER HISTORY

So it is interesting in this anti-humanist reductionist workout
to purview the predominant metaphorics travailing the texts. The
master architects of this discourse, in spite of their diversity in
interests and topical and thematic choices, reveal a grammatological space which reduces history, the past, the present, and the
future into two registers, what we might call the two registers of
adjectives and prepositions. What we see is a whole series of
adjectives before a noun "humanism," and a few prepositions,
linked by hyphen to the same noun "humanism." A register then
of qualifying, value-laden adjectives, of a world of contingencies,
judgments, presuppositions, dogmas, normatives, and causation
before the noun humanism on one side, and a register of positions,
of place, apparently instrinsically impervious to the murky world
of hierarchies, values, legitimation, on the other side. It looks
something like this:
Adjective-Noun

Preposition-Noun

Western humanism
traditional humanism
modern humanism
marxist humanism
liberal humanism
bourgeois humanism
Arnoldian humanism
Jamesonian humanism
literary humanism

Pre-humanism
Anti-humanism
Post-humanism

The occasional "neo" before humanism, having the disadvantage of being etymologically endowed with the potentiality of
escaping the hell of values for the pure eden of time and place,
that "neo" suffers the worst fate of all parts of speech in this
grammatical war of prepositions against adjectives. Caught in the
middle ground between the two camps, it is promptly handcuffed
to selective affinities with global "neo" activities: neo-humanists
ipso facto neo-fascists. So whatever (or should I say, whoever) is
wise enough to align itself with the "pre" or "post" or "anti"
before humanism is thought to advance progressively in time,
and whoever misses that late-twentieth-century speedy train is
condemned to terminal regression on an interminably boring ad-
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jectival recess. Subliminal metaphors arise from the texts: inertia
over motion, present over the past, place over value, object over
subject, preposition over adjective. The phenomenology of the
adjective here, to be overcome by the phenomenology of the preposition there. A contest between history and geometry that
chooses as battlefield the grounds of humanism, the discourse on
humanism as a pretext for the late-twentieth-century version of
the subjugation of history by geometry? The metaphorical subtext
of the discourse on humanism thus unravels a popularized version
of Husserlian eidetic reductionism in search of the purity of
geometrics uncontaminated by the world of history and time. It
is as if one crosses into a time zone of the past, as if Heidegger's
Sein und Zeit had never been written, as if the debate between
Husserl and Heidegger had never taken place, as if Husserl had
never written on the origins of geometry, as if Derrida had never
written his introduction to Husserl's Origin of Geometry. This is
particularly interesting since Derrida and Heidegger are more
often than not invited to join rank and file in that destruction of
humanism by geometrically constructive anti-humanists. 16 Late
in the twentieth century then, and inadvertently or not, a
metaphoric reactivating of a desire for the purity, simplicity, originality, and universality of spatial geometrics. Should the logics
of reductionism, on its way towards an anti-humanist and beautifully symmetricized space, on its way towards geometricity and
quantification, signal an ontic desire for a world devoid of qualities, values, presuppositions, and contingencies? This imaginarily
hierarchized registering of experience into the symbolics of
geometry and history, of prepositions and adjectives, is a tendency
towards privileging a viewing of, or a gazing at, the world rather
than sensuously interacting with the world, and it is an experiencing of the world on the basis of a single sense alone: the eye. The
complexities and differentiations of experience pulsating in the
many senses of our bodies in its interplay with the multiplicities
of world and life structures are here, at the end of the twentieth
century, at a historical threshold which wishes to relegate modernity to the past of history, again reduced to a phenomenology
which is epistemologically reminiscent of the beginnings, and not
of the ends, of modernity. Should Descartes' mathematization of
consciousness, so ardently refuted by those professing difference
in the name of difference, carry the day after all, and profitably?
Should this tendency towards simplicity, reduction, and geometrization assist the much desired quantifiability of the unconscious
and consciousness alike? 17
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4. RESISTANCE TO ILLITERACY

The current discourses, in the name of anti-humanism,
against humanism, are posited on the ethical assumption that
difference-multicultural,
ethnic, and gender-needs
to be put
on the political, the cultural, the critical map. 18 These goals are
noble ones. They seek affinities with a heritage of tolerance and
differentiation, of a vision of humanity which seeks human equality because and in spite of cultural, ethnic, and sexual differences.
Yet the methods applied in the search for differentiating practices
enhance reduction and not differentiation. And these reductionist
methods hardly present a challenge to the almost non-purveyable
complexity of the present-day university, which stems from the
complex systemic relations the university entertains, and necessarily entertains, with structures that lie beyond the domain of the
university. So a discourse on humanism and the university that
de-socializes the university by reducing it to the "English Institute"
and which de-historicizes humanism in accordance with Heidegger's reductive definition and wholesale rejection of humanism is
indeed no challenge to the complexity of the question of humanism
and the university. What I consider more serious is that this reductionism in method and conceptuality has great potential to feed
into the critical illiteracy of contemporary students already immersed in a general climate of cross-cultural and political illiteracy.
If critical illiteracy would lead to politically literate beings, and to
democratic and participatory social action, the military-industrialadministrative complex would no doubt divert some of its $1billion-a-day defense budget and put it into the run-down American school system, the historic countdown of which has already
begun. This process might not have to be irreversible. On the part
of the knowledge-exchange agency, less conceptual and methodological reduction in favor of more differentiation might help to
reverse that process.
4. RESISTANCE TO ILLITERACY

The current discourses, in the name of anti-humanism,
against humanism, are posited on the ethical assumption that
difference-multicultural,
ethnic, and gender-needs
to be put
on the political, the cultural, the critical map. 18 These goals are
noble ones. They seek affinities with a heritage of tolerance and
differentiation, of a vision of humanity which seeks human equality because and in spite of cultural, ethnic, and sexual differences.
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Yet the methods applied in the search for differentiating practices
enhance reduction and not differentiation. And these reductionist
methods hardly present a challenge to the almost non-purveyable
complexity of the present-day university, which stems from the
complex systemic relations the university entertains, and necessarily entertains, with structures that lie beyond the domain of the
university. So a discourse on humanism and the university that
de-socializes the university by reducing it to the "English Institute"
and which de-historicizes humanism in accordance with Heidegger's reductive definition and wholesale rejection of humanism is
indeed no challenge to the complexity of the question of humanism
and the university. What I consider more serious is that this reductionism in method and conceptuality has great potential to feed
into the critical illiteracy of contemporary students already immersed in a general climate of cross-cultural and political illiteracy .
If critical illiteracy would lead to politically literate beings, and to
democratic and participatory social action, the military-industrialadministrative complex would no doubt divert some of its $1
billion-a-day defense budget and put it into the run-down American school system, the historic countdown of which has already
begun. This process might not have to be irreversible. On the part
of the knowledge-exchange agency, less conceptual and methodological reduction in favor of more differentiation might help to
reverse that process.
The current anti-humanists, as we have seen some of them
in action in the 1984/85 issue of Boundary2, surely would not want
to see themselves as a group that says farewell to social responsibility and political literacy. Yet on account of the general reductive
critical practices they help to propagate, they are on the best way
of doing so. What is missing, for instance, in the current antihumanist discourse is an analysis of what the predominant discourse is; of how many different and differentiable levels there
are. How the predominant discourse in literature or English departments differs from practices and discourses in other fields
within the humanities, the social sciences, and the hard sciences,
and what the relationship is between hegemonic fields and marginal fields; and what the relation of the university is to major
sources of funding and wealth. These are projects that cannot be
carried out solely by academics from the English department, no
matter how much they claim, in the name of anti-humanism, to
speak for the university and against humanism. In order to counter
elitist, non-democractic practices, we need to build an alliance
and form, next to and with intellectuals from the sciences and the
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social sciences, a literate critical bloc. When it comes to the question
of humanism and the university, we need the expertise of
economists, scientists, physicists, and ecologists as well as intellectuals from the so-called social sciences and humanities to
analyze the forms of hegemony which surround us, intersect in
us, and in which we live. This alliance might help us to analyze
to what extent we are complicitous, to what extent we construct
philosophies of consent to that surrounding hegemony of interested power. Reductionist generalities, in methodologies and
approach, when it comes to the university and the humanities
are no longer in place. And perhaps it might be useful, in a final
Weberian/Habermasian note, to remember that the apparently
increasing decentralization in systems and sub-systems of the various fields of knowledge-a disparity which often finds expression
in apparent incommensurabilities and incompatibilities of theories
and bodies of knowledge-that
state of affairs might well be the
preferred strategy for an increasingly centralizing system to profitably function, to exercise, that is, and not to exorcise,
hegemony. 18
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intermittent entries on humanism, the history of intellectuals, and the state in
the Quadernide/ Carcere,which are being translated into English by Joseph Buttigieg. Gramsci approaches Italian humanism in its relation to the intellectuals
on one hand, and in its relation to the non-formation of a centralized Italian
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10. Ernesto Grassi, Heideggerand the Question of RenaissanceHumanism. Four
Studies (Binghampton, NY: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies,
1983).
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Siikularisierungund Selbstbehauptung,and Der Prozess der theoretischenNeugierde
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Autobiografia,criticae politica.(Torino: G. B. Paravano, 1924). For Gramsci's indebtedness to De Sanctis, see his "Back to De Sanctis," in Antonio Gramsci, Selections
from Cultural Writings, cit. in note 9.
15. Saveria Chemotti, Umanesimo, Rinascimento, Machiavelli nella critica
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